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CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS

corroboration before admitting extra-judicial
confessions, many jurisdictions leave the order
of proof entirely to the discretion of the trial
court.5" Other courts have announced that the
corroboration should be submitted first,' but
no case has been found reversing a conviction
because the order of proof had been disregarded." Once the confession is admitted it
may be considered along with the other evidence as proof that a crime was committed;n
thus the strongest evidence of guilt need not
58Ibid.; Adolfson v. United States, 159 F.2d 883,
888 (9th Cir. 1947); Watts v. State, 229 Ind. 80,
95 N.E.2d 570 (1950).
5 Note, People v. Grimes, 91 Cal. App.2d 629,
205 P.2d 416 (1949); People v. Porter, 269 Mich.
284, 257 N.W. 705 (1934) (although admissions as
distinguished from confessions need not be corroborated first). Note, Evidence-Corpus Delicti, 17 TErp.
L. Q. 189 (1943).
60Although there appears to be a conflict in these
views, it is likely that the courts that have stated
the stricter rule will back down when the issue is
squarely presented. They will probably follow the
lead of the decisions that emphasize that it would
be more appropriate to have confessions introduced
after the other evidence, but hold that any error is
cured by the subsequent corroboration. People v.
Durfee, 79 Cal. App. 2d 632, 180 P.2d 373 (1947);
Anthony v. State, 44 Fla. 1, 32 So. 818 (1902);
Ashby v. State, 124 Tenn. 684, 139 S.W. 872 (1911).
" Parker v. State, 228 Ind. 1, 88 N.E.2d 556
(1949); Pope v. State, 158 Miss. 794, 131 So. 264
(1930).

be kept separate from the proof of the corpus
delicti. In nearly every jurisdiction circumstantial evidence may be used as corrobation
2
of confessions.
CONCLUSION

Proving the corpus delicti in arson cases
presents special problems because of the lack
of sufficient evidence that survives the fire and
because arson is one crime for which the presumption of accidental loss is uniquely appropriate. Careful investigation with full
knowledge of the type of evidence that is
frequently used and considered legally competent can uncover much that is not apparent
at first sight. The courts appreciate the problems involved in finding proof of an intentional
fire and permit a wide range of evidence to be
used to establish it. Furthermore, there are
few restrictions that apply particularly to the
corpus delicti to limit the presentation of a
case. While the leniency of courts in admitting
evidence increases the risk of conviction when
no crime has been committed, the danger can
be minimized by the exercise of caution in
judging the sufficiency of proof. This caution,
however, should not require the use of. artificial rules.
62 Note, Proof of the Corpus Delicti by Circumstantial Evidence, 4 TEmn. L. Q. 79 (1929); People
v. Borelli, 392 Ill. 481, 64 N.E.2d 719 (1946); Warke
v. Commonwealth, 279 Ky. 659, 180 S.W.2d 876
(1944).

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Army Court-Martial's Use of Body Fluid
Taken from Soldier while Unconscious Does
Not Violate Due Process or the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination--The United States
Court of Military Appeals has ruled that the
privilege against self-incrimination does not
prohibit the use of a urine specimen obtained
fior a soldier by catheterization while he was
unconscious. United States v. Williamson,
4 U.S.C.M.A. 320 (1954). The distinction is
made that the privilege applies only when
"active and conscious use of the mental facilities" are utilized. Thus the decision adopts

the majority view of the state courts, although
the federal decisions reveal no clear answer.
The court disposes of Rochin v. California,
342 U.S 165 (1952) (extraction of fluid by
stomach pump held violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment) by limiting it to cases where the
methods of obtaining the evidence "offend
against canons of decency and fairness." The
fact that the Model Code of Evidence would
permit the procedure of the instant case is
relied upon by the court as one indication of
fairness. The opinion is silent as to whether
the urine specimen- were taken for purposes of

CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS

diagnosis or evidence. If the only purpose were
the former, a possible physician-patient privilege might be in issue.
Coercion Invalidating First Confession
Carries Over to Confessions Immediately
Following-In a state prosecution for murder
of his parents, the defendant was subject to
days and nights of intensive police questioning.
Then a state-employed psychiatrist, whom
the defendant believed was to treat him for
an acute attack of sinus, induced a confession
while police listened through concealed microphones. This confession was immediately followed by additional confessions given in rapid
succession to a police officer, defendant's
business partner, and state prosecutors. The
highest state court reversed a conviction on
the ground that the confession made to the
psychiatrist had been extorted by coercion.
At a second trial only the other confessions
were used. Defendant objected to the admission of these other confessions on the ground
that they were also obtained by coercion and
promises of leniency, but the trial court submitted to the jury the question of their "voluntariness". Defendant was again convicted, the
death penalty imposed, and his conviction
affirmed. The case came before the Supreme
Court of the United States after his habeas
corpus petition was denied by two lower federal
courts.
Five members of the Supreme Court, in an
opinion by Justice Black, granted relief, Leyra
v. Denno, 74 Sup. Ct. 716 (1954), holding that
the coercive character of the first confession
carried over to subsequent ones, all being
parts of one continuous process. The Court
cites the long line of cases establishing that the
use in a state criminal trial of a defendant's
confession obtained by coercion-whether
physical or mental-is forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment. As to whether the confessions were so coerced, the Court states, "an
already physically and emotionally exhausted
suspect's ability to resist interrogation was
broken to almost trance-like submission by use
of the arts of a highly skilled psychiatrist."
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Justices Minton, Reed, and Burton dissented.
They reasoned that while there is a presumption that the coercion persisted so as to influence subsequent confessions, it can be rebutted by various circumstances, and that an
invalid confession does not ipso facto invalidate
all subsequent confessions as a matter of law.
The dissenters concluded that it was the very
essence of due process to submit the question
of "voluntariness" to the jury.
Disagreement as to Whether a Recording
Made by a Party to Telephone Call Violates
Federal Wire-Tapping Statute-Two judges of
the Federal District Court for the District of
Columbia came to opposite conclusions as to
the scope of the Federal Communication Act.
Section 605 of the Act provides that "no person
not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish
its contents." In United States v. Stephenson,
121 F. Supp. 274 (D.D.C. 1954), it was held
that "no person" includes one of the participants in the telephone conversation and
that the consent of the "sender" is not obtained
until both parties authorize the recording. In
United States v. Sullivan, 116 F. Supp. 480
(D.D.C. 1953), decided only a few months
before, the court ruled that the consent of one
participant is enough to legalize a wire tap.
One Convicted of Unlawfully Possessing
Illegal Instrumentalities May Not Have
Sufficient Interest Therein to Raise Question
of Unlawful Search and Seizure-Defendant,
president and manager of an incorporated social
club, was convicted of unlawfully possessing
slot machines. The machines were the property
of the club. A timely motion was denied to
suppress their admission as evidence on the
ground that they had been illegally seized in
violation of the United States and Illinois
Constitutions. On appeal, held affirmed. People
v. Perry, 1 Ill. 2d. 482, 116 N.E. 2d 360 (1953).
Since the so-called "federal exclusionary rule"
(which Illinois and a majority of the states
follow) is based upon the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, the courts
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have held that it is available only to one whose
constitutional rights have, in fact, been invaded. The court concluded that while the
search might be illegal as to the corporation,
it was not to the defendant. The court found
no paradox in the fact that the defendant
"could be so far in possession of the machines
as to be charged with illegally possessing them
and yet not have such an interest as would
enable him to cause their exclusion." Federal
cases expressing the same view and relied upon
by the Illinois Supreme Court are United
States v. DeVasto, 52 F. 2d 26 (2d. Cir. 1931);
Kelley v. United States, 61 F.2d 843 (8th Cir.
1932).
Statements Made by Defendant to Senate
Committee Counsel are Admissible in Evidence-Federal Criminal Code Section 3486,
barring use in criminal proceedings of defendant's testimony "before any committee"
of Congress, does not bar use of statements
made by defendant voluntarily to Senate Committee's counsel. United States v. Brennan,
22 U.S.L. Week 2591 (May 27, 1954). The
court, although recognizing that the committee counsel was acting as an arm of the
committee, held that the statements were not
made "before any committee." Even though
it was assumed that the counsel was acting on
behalf of the committee at the time the information was divulged, the court noted that
a refusal by the defendant to give the information would not have subjected him to contempt charges.
Right to Public Trial Violated by Exclusion
of Public and Press-Exclusion of public and
press violated New York Statutes guaranteeing
the accused a public trial, ruled the court in
reversing a prosecution for compulsory prostitution. People v. Jelke, 22 U.S.L. Week 2575
(May 18, 1954). The Sixth Amendment was
held not applicable. The court recognized the
inherent right of a judge to control the conduct
of the trial, but held this did not justify excluding spectators on the ground that the case
had been over-publicized. It was deemed par-

ticularly prejudicial that the trial was closed
for the presentation of the state's case and
open when the defendant's side testified. Thus
a witness would be shielded from publicity if
testifying for the prosecution but be in the
"pitiless glare of press and public" if a witness
for the defense. Two justices dissented, expressing the view that the ruling deprived a
trial court of the power to prevent itself from
being a source of filthy news; and that the
permission to have a reasonable number of
friends and relatives present satisfied the right
to a public trial.
Attorney Who Represented Client During
Period when Latter Was Pursuing a Career
of Crime May Not Invoke Attorney-Client
Privilege-The attorney-client 'privilege is
based on -the need for private communication
between attorney and client without fear of
disclosure. The privilege is personal to the
client and only he may waive it. Moreover, an
attorney called as a witness must assert the
privilege if applicable. The New Jersey Supreme
Court ruled that a grand jury may compel an
attorney to name bribed officials revealed to
him by a deceased racketeer. The court adopts
the view advanced by the Model Code of
Evidence in holding that where the client
consults the attorney in furtherance of criminal
activities no privilege exists. In Re Selser,
105 A. 2d 395 (N.J. 1954). This is true whether
or not the attorney is aware of his client's
purposes. Since the privilege is without constitutional sanction it is even more properly
limited beyond its legitimate purposes. The
opinion quotes from Clark v. United States,
289 U.S. 1 (1933), to the effect that there
must be some prima facie evidence of the illegal
nature of the attorney-client meetings to
warrant withdrawal of the privilege. After
stating that such determination is for the
court rather than for the attorney, the New
Jersey Court points to the more than 200
meetings at a time when the client was bribing
public officials as constituting this prima facie
evidence. Three justices dissented on the ground
that there was no evidence that advice in aid
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of future wrongdoing was given, and that only
past acts were involved.
New Insanity Tests-The New Mexico
Supreme Court has adopted the "irresistible
impulse" test as a third category which will
constitute the defense of insanity. Under the
widely accepted M'Naghten rule only the
inability to distinguish between right and
wrong, or not being able to comprehend the
nature and quality of his act excused a defendant. The court holds a good defense exists
if the defendant can show he was suffering from
a mental disease which made him incapable of
preventing himself from committing the crime,
even if he knew the nature and quality of his
act and that it was wrong. State v. White,
270 P. 2d 727 (N.M. 1954). This view has
been approved by only a small minority of the
states. The court cautions, however, that it
recognizes only a "true disease of the mind...
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as distinguished from a sort of momentary
insanity arising from the pressure of circumstances."
The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has gone further. In 1929 the court
had recognized the "irresistible impulse" test
in addition to the M'Naghten rule; and in
Durham v. United States, 23 U.S.L. Week 1001
(July 1, 1954), it was held that a defendant
established the defense of insanity if he proves
simply that his unlawful act was the product of
a mental disease or mental defect. Thus if
some evidence of insanity is presented, the
jury must be instructed to acquit unless it is
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
either the defendant did not suffer from a
disease or defective mental condition at the
time of the act, or that the act was not the
product of this condition. New Hampshire is
the only other jurisdiction to have a similar
rule.

